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REVIEWS

The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani
mals. T he second part of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond, and by this proclama
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited.
Any member who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed'
list should contact the Editor.

Stephen Wal ker, Animal Thought
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1983
Walker summarizes the argument of
his book in the following words:
his�
Human thought is intimately
connected with the activities of
the human brain; other verte
verte
brate animals apart from our
our
selves have very complicated
brains,
and in some cases
brains which appear to be
physically very much like our
own; this suggests that what
goes on in animals brains has a
good deal in common with what
goes on in human brains; and
laboratory experiments on ani
ani
mal behaviou r provide some
measure of support for this
suggestion (p. xiii).
His conclusion is that
it makes sense to suppose that
awareness and mental organiza
organiza
tion occur in animals, without
the involvement of language
(xiii) .
The book is divided into three
parts. The first three chapters pro
pro
vide a history of philosophical and
psychological theories concerning ani
ani
mal thought. Chapter 1 is devoted to
the philosophers.
It focuses on Des
Des
cartes, naturally, but also contains
summaries of the Aristotlean-Aquinian
position against which Descartes was

working and of the Lockean, Humean,
and Schopenhauerean positions devel
devel
oped
in opposition
to
Descartes.
Chapter 2 deals with Darwin and some
of the nineteenth century thinkers he
influenced, Romanes, Huxley, Marx,
Engels, and Lloyd Morgan. Chapter 3
deals with twentieth centu ry theories
of animal
thought,
ranging
from
Thorndi ke and Pavlov th rough Watson,
Tolman, and Skinner to Piaget, Grif
Grif
fin, and MacKintosh.
All Walker's summaries in these
three chapters are lucid,
well-fo
well-fo
cused, and engaging. Chapters 2 and
3 will be of particular interest to
those, like myself, who are basically
ignorant of the history of psychology.
For example, I was surprised to learn
that psychological experiments on ani
ani
mals were begun in reaction against
Darwinian theorists and the field
studies they employed. E. L. Thorn
Thorn
dike, "who introduced the laboratory
experiment into an imal psychology, . .
pointed out that previous authors
had paid much more attention to ani
ani
mal intelligence than to animal stupid
stupid
ity.
Thorndi ke's tone th roughout is
that of a man who is going to remedy
this omission" (61).
Also surprising,
at least to me, was the split between
psychologists, such as Wal ker, who
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are sympathetic to the idea of animal
intelligence on the basis of physiologi
cal evolution and ethologists, such as
G riffl n
(T he Question of Ani
Animal
mal
Awareness), who are sympathetic to
this idea on the basis of animal
behavior.
Walker tends to discount
ethological studies of intelligent animal
behavior, such as Griffin's study of
the language of the honey bee, when
the claimed intelligence of the behav
ior does not correspond to an appro
priate level of brain development. It
would seem that philosophical pre
commitments remain alive and well in
animal psychology.
The second section of the book is
devoted to physiological evidence con
cerning animal intelligence. Chapter 4
deals with the sequence and relations
in vertebrate brain evolution.
Chap
ter 5 deals with the fu nctions of the
various parts of the vertebrate brain
and the conservation or change of
functions as the structu re of the
brain evolves.
Chapter 6 discusses
these functions and their evolution in
the life and su rvival of an imals.
Walker summarizes the conclusion of
these physiological chapters as fol
lows:
I have supported the idea that
the functions of the different
divisions of the brain are more
or less the same in all verte
brates, and that therefore we
should expect the functions of
intelligence, thought, and cog
nition to be present roughly in
proportion to how well the for
ebrain seems to be developed.
A fish, frog, or lizard does
not have very much by way of
cerebral
hemispheres,
and
should therefore have very lit
tle cognition. But this little is
a much more generous allow
ance than that given by other
theories, which say that such
forebrain as is
present in
non-mammals is not used for
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cogn ition,
or attention,
or
learning, at all, but is only
there to respond to smells, or
to program primitive instincts.
These other theories are prob
ably wrong (192-193).
Thus, Walker sees physiology sup
porting something like the "difference
of degree" approach to animal vs.
human thought favored by Locke and
Hume, rather than the "difference in
kind" (if it makes and sense to talk of
animal
thought
at
all)
approach
favored by Descartes and many con
temporary, neo-Cartesian opponents of
animal rights (e.g., R. G. Frey,
I nterests and Rights).
The third section of the book is
devoted to psychological studies of
an imal thought.
Chapter 7 concerns
the cognitive dimensions of animal
perception. Chapter 8 deals with ani
mal memory, and Chapter 9 discusses
symbolic awareness,
communication,
and attempts to teach apes human lan
guages.
Not su rprisingly, Walker finds that
the psychological evidence confi rms
the "difference of degree" position
supported by· the physiological evi
dence. I n the case of perception,
if a bi rd sees a tree as some
thing which
can
be flown
around and possibly landed on
and nested in, the argument is
that this requires a perceptual
schema of some complexity,
which may be closer to an
expressible verbal concept than
to a succession of instinctive
responses to exactly prepro
grammed sensations (284).
Turning to memory,
If the perceptual apparatus of
an an imal is used to construct
descriptions of what is per
ceived,
in order to detect
objects and things rather than
isolated sensations, then one
would certainly expect continu
ity and discontin uity with time
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to be a necessary part of the
descriptions.
However, more
complicated brains would be
heeded
to
construct
such
descriptions, and to store them
over time,
than
would
be
needed· to react to a simple
stimulus, such as a bright
light, and to modify reactions
according to whether previous
reactions to bright Iights had
been strengthened by the ing
ingestion of food, or such like.
There is reason to believe that
the cerebral hemispheres of
vertebrate brains are particu
particularly
important for,
among
other things, the utilisation of
memories as opposed to such
simple habits (337-338) .
Concerning
language,
Walker
is
inclined to deny that Washoe and the
other signing apes have learned a
human language, because of the mini
minimal grammar in their communications.
As might be expected, he favors an
evolutionary
view
of
non-human
nea r-Ia nguages:
Whatever
the
sources
and
stages in the evol ution
of
human language, there remain
sufficient similarities between
human and animal brain func
function to allow for comparison.
The similarities depend on the
assumption that animal brains
are devices for selecting and
organising perceived informa
information, and that the neu ral sys
systems which accomplish percep
perception
and
memory
exhibit
evolutionary continuity. Beha
Behavioural data support the con
contention that mental organisation
exists in animals, in particular
in non-human primates, as a
necessary part of the percep-

tion of objects and their locali
localisation and interrelationships in
space and time.
It does not
seem unreasonable to suppose,
therefore, that the development
of
the
distinctively
human
capacity
for
language took
place via the deployment of the
same forms of mental organisa
organisation
for
new
pu rposes
(380-391) .
proIn conclusion, Walker's book pro
vides a good crash course in the his
history, physiology, and psychology of
animal thought.
Since animal rights
philosophers and advocates are often
dismissed by scientists as being woe
woefully ignorant of the facts about ani
animal mental capacities, reading this
book can be recommended as a con
convenient way of catching such detrac
detractors by surprise and making them eat
their words. However, at the begin
beginning of Animal Thought, Walker says
that he has "deliberately avoided the
question of how theories of animal
psychology might impinge on opinions
about
our
moral
responsibilities
towards animals" (xiii); so, this book
contains no ethical theory or conclu
conclusions.
This book does contain sum
summaries and analyses of many experi
experiments
involving
the
deprivation,
mutilation,
and killing of animals
which are exemplary of the idle curi
curiosities which animal physiologists and
psychologists call "science".
Many
readers will, consequently, find parts
of this book thoroughly distasteful.
One can only hope that the argument
developed in Animal Thought wi II come
to impinge on our moral responsibili
responsibilities to animals, so that the pointless
suffering of animals reported in its
pages may thereby finally come to
some good purpose.
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